Secrets management

OpenClaw supports additive SecretRefs so supported credentials do not need to be stored as plaintext in configuration.

Plaintext still works. SecretRefs are opt-in per credential.

Goals and runtime model

Secrets are resolved into an in-memory runtime snapshot.

Resolution is eager during activation, not lazy on request paths.
Startup fails fast when an effectively active SecretRef cannot be resolved.
Reload uses atomic swap: full success, or keep the last-known-good snapshot.
SecretRef policy violations (for example OAuth-mode auth profiles combined with SecretRef input) fail activation before runtime swap.
Runtime requests read from the active in-memory snapshot only.
After the first successful config activation/load, runtime code paths keep reading that active in-memory snapshot until a successful reload swaps it.
Outbound delivery paths also read from that active snapshot (for example Discord reply/thread delivery and Telegram action sends); they do not re-resolve SecretRefs on each send.

This keeps secret-provider outages off hot request paths.

Active-surface filtering

SecretRefs are validated only on effectively active surfaces.

Enabled surfaces: unresolved refs block startup/reload.
Inactive surfaces: unresolved refs do not block startup/reload.
Inactive refs emit non-fatal diagnostics with code SECRETS_REF_IGNORED_INACTIVE_SURFACE.

Examples of inactive surfaces

Disabled channel/account entries.
Top-level channel credentials that no enabled account inherits.
Disabled tool/feature surfaces.
Web search provider-specific keys that are not selected by tools.web.search.provider. In auto mode (provider unset), keys are consulted by precedence for provider auto-detection until one resolves. After selection, non-selected provider keys are treated as inactive until selected.
Sandbox SSH auth material (agents.defaults.sandbox.ssh.identityData, certificateData, knownHostsData, plus per-agent overrides) is active only when the effective sandbox backend is ssh for the default agent or an enabled agent.
gateway.remote.token / gateway.remote.password SecretRefs are active if one of these is true:
- gateway.mode=remote
- gateway.remote.url is configured
- gateway.tailscale.mode is serve or funnel
- In local mode without those remote surfaces:
  - gateway.remote.token is active when token auth can win and no env/auth token is configured.
  - gateway.remote.password is active only when password auth can win and no env/auth password is configured.
gateway.auth.token SecretRef is inactive for startup auth resolution when OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN is set, because env token input wins for that runtime.

Gateway auth surface diagnostics

When a SecretRef is configured on gateway.auth.token, gateway.auth.password, gateway.remote.token, or gateway.remote.password, gateway startup/reload logs the surface state explicitly:

active: the SecretRef is part of the effective auth surface and must resolve.
inactive: the SecretRef is ignored for this runtime because another auth surface wins, or because remote auth is disabled/not active.

These entries are logged with SECRETS_GATEWAY_AUTH_SURFACE and include the reason used by the active-surface policy, so you can see why a credential was treated as active or inactive.

Onboarding reference preflight

When onboarding runs in interactive mode and you choose SecretRef storage, OpenClaw runs preflight validation before saving:

Env refs: validates env var name and confirms a non-empty value is visible during setup.
Provider refs (file or exec): validates provider selection, resolves id, and checks resolved value type.
Quickstart reuse path: when gateway.auth.token is already a SecretRef, onboarding resolves it before probe/dashboard bootstrap (for env, file, and exec refs) using the same fail-fast gate.

If validation fails, onboarding shows the error and lets you retry.

SecretRef contract

Use one object shape everywhere:

{ source: "env" | "file" | "exec", provider: "default", id: "..." }

env
file
exec

{ source: "env", provider: "default", id: "OPENAI_API_KEY" }

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must match ^[A-Z][A-Z0-9_]{0,127}$

{ source: "file", provider: "filemain", id: "/providers/openai/apiKey" }

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must be an absolute JSON pointer (/...)
RFC6901 escaping in segments: ~ => ~0, / => ~1

{ source: "exec", provider: "vault", id: "providers/openai/apiKey" }

Validation:

provider must match ^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]{0,63}$
id must match ^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._:/-]{0,255}$
id must not contain . or .. as slash-delimited path segments (for example a/../b is rejected)

Provider config

Define providers under secrets.providers:

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      default: { source: "env" },
      filemain: {
        source: "file",
        path: "~/.openclaw/secrets.json",
        mode: "json", // or "singleValue"
      },
      vault: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/usr/local/bin/openclaw-vault-resolver",
        args: ["--profile", "prod"],
        passEnv: ["PATH", "VAULT_ADDR"],
        jsonOnly: true,
      },
    },
    defaults: {
      env: "default",
      file: "filemain",
      exec: "vault",
    },
    resolution: {
      maxProviderConcurrency: 4,
      maxRefsPerProvider: 512,
      maxBatchBytes: 262144,
    },
  },
}

Env provider

Optional allowlist via allowlist.
Missing/empty env values fail resolution.

File provider

Reads local file from path.
mode: "json" expects JSON object payload and resolves id as pointer.
mode: "singleValue" expects ref id "value" and returns file contents.
Path must pass ownership/permission checks.
Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for a path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set allowInsecurePath: true on that provider to bypass path security checks.

Exec provider

Runs configured absolute binary path, no shell.
By default, command must point to a regular file (not a symlink).
Set allowSymlinkCommand: true to allow symlink command paths (for example Homebrew shims). OpenClaw validates the resolved target path.
Pair allowSymlinkCommand with trustedDirs for package-manager paths (for example ["/opt/homebrew"]).
Supports timeout, no-output timeout, output byte limits, env allowlist, and trusted dirs.
Windows fail-closed note: if ACL verification is unavailable for the command path, resolution fails. For trusted paths only, set allowInsecurePath: true on that provider to bypass path security checks.

Request payload (stdin):

{ "protocolVersion": 1, "provider": "vault", "ids": ["providers/openai/apiKey"] }

Response payload (stdout):

{ "protocolVersion": 1, "values": { "providers/openai/apiKey": "<openai-api-key>" } } // pragma: allowlist secret

Optional per-id errors:

{
  "protocolVersion": 1,
  "values": {},
  "errors": { "providers/openai/apiKey": { "message": "not found" } }
}

Exec integration examples

1Password CLI

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      onepassword_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/op",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["read", "op://Personal/OpenClaw QA API Key/password"],
        passEnv: ["HOME"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "onepassword_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

HashiCorp Vault CLI

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      vault_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/vault",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["kv", "get", "-field=OPENAI_API_KEY", "secret/openclaw"],
        passEnv: ["VAULT_ADDR", "VAULT_TOKEN"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "vault_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

sops

{
  secrets: {
    providers: {
      sops_openai: {
        source: "exec",
        command: "/opt/homebrew/bin/sops",
        allowSymlinkCommand: true, // required for Homebrew symlinked binaries
        trustedDirs: ["/opt/homebrew"],
        args: ["-d", "--extract", '["providers"]["openai"]["apiKey"]', "/path/to/secrets.enc.json"],
        passEnv: ["SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE"],
        jsonOnly: false,
      },
    },
  },
  models: {
    providers: {
      openai: {
        baseUrl: "https://api.openai.com/v1",
        models: [{ id: "gpt-5", name: "gpt-5" }],
        apiKey: { source: "exec", provider: "sops_openai", id: "value" },
      },
    },
  },
}

MCP server environment variables

MCP server env vars configured via plugins.entries.acpx.config.mcpServers support SecretInput. This keeps API keys and tokens out of plaintext config:

{
  plugins: {
    entries: {
      acpx: {
        enabled: true,
        config: {
          mcpServers: {
            github: {
              command: "npx",
              args: ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-github"],
              env: {
                GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN: {
                  source: "env",
                  provider: "default",
                  id: "MCP_GITHUB_PAT",
                },
              },
            },
          },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Plaintext string values still work. Env-template refs like ${MCP_SERVER_API_KEY} and SecretRef objects are resolved during gateway activation before the MCP server process is spawned. As with other SecretRef surfaces, unresolved refs only block activation when the acpx plugin is effectively active.

Sandbox SSH auth material

The core ssh sandbox backend also supports SecretRefs for SSH auth material:

{
  agents: {
    defaults: {
      sandbox: {
        mode: "all",
        backend: "ssh",
        ssh: {
          target: "user@gateway-host:22",
          identityData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_IDENTITY" },
          certificateData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_CERTIFICATE" },
          knownHostsData: { source: "env", provider: "default", id: "SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS" },
        },
      },
    },
  },
}

Runtime behavior:

OpenClaw resolves these refs during sandbox activation, not lazily during each SSH call.
Resolved values are written to temp files with restrictive permissions and used in generated SSH config.
If the effective sandbox backend is not ssh, these refs stay inactive and do not block startup.

Supported credential surface

Canonical supported and unsupported credentials are listed in:

SecretRef Credential Surface

Runtime-minted or rotating credentials and OAuth refresh material are intentionally excluded from read-only SecretRef resolution.

Required behavior and precedence

Field without a ref: unchanged.
Field with a ref: required on active surfaces during activation.
If both plaintext and ref are present, ref takes precedence on supported precedence paths.
The redaction sentinel __OPENCLAW_REDACTED__ is reserved for internal config redaction/restore and is rejected as literal submitted config data.

Warning and audit signals:

SECRETS_REF_OVERRIDES_PLAINTEXT (runtime warning)
REF_SHADOWED (audit finding when auth-profiles.json credentials take precedence over openclaw.json refs)

Google Chat compatibility behavior:

serviceAccountRef takes precedence over plaintext serviceAccount.
Plaintext value is ignored when sibling ref is set.

Activation triggers

Secret activation runs on:

Startup (preflight plus final activation)
Config reload hot-apply path
Config reload restart-check path
Manual reload via secrets.reload
Gateway config write RPC preflight (config.set / config.apply / config.patch) for active-surface SecretRef resolvability within the submitted config payload before persisting edits

Activation contract:

Success swaps the snapshot atomically.
Startup failure aborts gateway startup.
Runtime reload failure keeps the last-known-good snapshot.
Write-RPC preflight failure rejects the submitted config and keeps both disk config and active runtime snapshot unchanged.
Providing an explicit per-call channel token to an outbound helper/tool call does not trigger SecretRef activation; activation points remain startup, reload, and explicit secrets.reload.

Degraded and recovered signals

When reload-time activation fails after a healthy state, OpenClaw enters degraded secrets state. One-shot system event and log codes:

SECRETS_RELOADER_DEGRADED
SECRETS_RELOADER_RECOVERED

Behavior:

Degraded: runtime keeps last-known-good snapshot.
Recovered: emitted once after the next successful activation.
Repeated failures while already degraded log warnings but do not spam events.
Startup fail-fast does not emit degraded events because runtime never became active.

Command-path resolution

Command paths can opt into supported SecretRef resolution via gateway snapshot RPC. There are two broad behaviors:

Strict command paths
Read-only command paths

For example openclaw memory remote-memory paths and openclaw qr --remote when it needs remote shared-secret refs. They read from the active snapshot and fail fast when a required SecretRef is unavailable.

For example openclaw status, openclaw status --all, openclaw channels status, openclaw channels resolve, openclaw security audit, and read-only doctor/config repair flows. They also prefer the active snapshot, but degrade instead of aborting when a targeted SecretRef is unavailable in that command path.Read-only behavior:

When the gateway is running, these commands read from the active snapshot first.
If gateway resolution is incomplete or the gateway is unavailable, they attempt targeted local fallback for the specific command surface.
If a targeted SecretRef is still unavailable, the command continues with degraded read-only output and explicit diagnostics such as “configured but unavailable in this command path”.
This degraded behavior is command-local only. It does not weaken runtime startup, reload, or send/auth paths.

Other notes:

Snapshot refresh after backend secret rotation is handled by openclaw secrets reload.
Gateway RPC method used by these command paths: secrets.resolve.

Audit and configure workflow

Default operator flow:

Audit current state

openclaw secrets audit --check

Configure SecretRefs

openclaw secrets configure

Re-audit

openclaw secrets audit --check

secrets audit

Findings include:

plaintext values at rest (openclaw.json, auth-profiles.json, .env, and generated agents/*/agent/models.json)
plaintext sensitive provider header residues in generated models.json entries
unresolved refs
precedence shadowing (auth-profiles.json taking priority over openclaw.json refs)
legacy residues (auth.json, OAuth reminders)

Exec note:

By default, audit skips exec SecretRef resolvability checks to avoid command side effects.
Use openclaw secrets audit --allow-exec to execute exec providers during audit.

Header residue note:

Sensitive provider header detection is name-heuristic based (common auth/credential header names and fragments such as authorization, x-api-key, token, secret, password, and credential).

secrets configure

Interactive helper that:

configures secrets.providers first (env/file/exec, add/edit/remove)
lets you select supported secret-bearing fields in openclaw.json plus auth-profiles.json for one agent scope
can create a new auth-profiles.json mapping directly in the target picker
captures SecretRef details (source, provider, id)
runs preflight resolution
can apply immediately

Exec note:

Preflight skips exec SecretRef checks unless --allow-exec is set.
If you apply directly from configure --apply and the plan includes exec refs/providers, keep --allow-exec set for the apply step too.

Helpful modes:

openclaw secrets configure --providers-only
openclaw secrets configure --skip-provider-setup
openclaw secrets configure --agent <id>

configure apply defaults:

scrub matching static credentials from auth-profiles.json for targeted providers
scrub legacy static api_key entries from auth.json
scrub matching known secret lines from <config-dir>/.env

secrets apply

Apply a saved plan:

openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --allow-exec
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run
openclaw secrets apply --from /tmp/openclaw-secrets-plan.json --dry-run --allow-exec

Exec note:

dry-run skips exec checks unless --allow-exec is set.
write mode rejects plans containing exec SecretRefs/providers unless --allow-exec is set.

For strict target/path contract details and exact rejection rules, see Secrets Apply Plan Contract.

One-way safety policy

OpenClaw intentionally does not write rollback backups containing historical plaintext secret values.

Safety model:

preflight must succeed before write mode
runtime activation is validated before commit
apply updates files using atomic file replacement and best-effort restore on failure

Legacy auth compatibility notes

For static credentials, runtime no longer depends on plaintext legacy auth storage.

Runtime credential source is the resolved in-memory snapshot.
Legacy static api_key entries are scrubbed when discovered.
OAuth-related compatibility behavior remains separate.

Web UI note

Some SecretInput unions are easier to configure in raw editor mode than in form mode.

Authentication — auth setup
CLI: secrets — CLI commands
Environment Variables — environment precedence
SecretRef Credential Surface — credential surface
Secrets Apply Plan Contract — plan contract details
Security — security posture

Gateway

Remote access

Security

Nodes and media

Web interfaces

Secrets management

Goals and runtime model

Active-surface filtering

Gateway auth surface diagnostics

Onboarding reference preflight

SecretRef contract

Provider config

Exec integration examples

MCP server environment variables

Sandbox SSH auth material

Supported credential surface

Required behavior and precedence

Activation triggers

Degraded and recovered signals

Command-path resolution

Audit and configure workflow

One-way safety policy

Legacy auth compatibility notes

Web UI note

Gateway

Remote access

Security

Nodes and media

Web interfaces

Documentation Index

​Goals and runtime model

​Active-surface filtering

​Gateway auth surface diagnostics

​Onboarding reference preflight

​SecretRef contract

​Provider config

​Exec integration examples

​MCP server environment variables

​Sandbox SSH auth material

​Supported credential surface

​Required behavior and precedence

​Activation triggers

​Degraded and recovered signals

​Command-path resolution

​Audit and configure workflow

​One-way safety policy

​Legacy auth compatibility notes

​Web UI note

​Related

Goals and runtime model

Active-surface filtering

Gateway auth surface diagnostics

Onboarding reference preflight

SecretRef contract

Provider config

Exec integration examples

MCP server environment variables

Sandbox SSH auth material

Supported credential surface

Required behavior and precedence

Activation triggers

Degraded and recovered signals

Command-path resolution

Audit and configure workflow

One-way safety policy

Legacy auth compatibility notes

Web UI note

Related