Operator incident response

Incident response

Contain

1. Stop it: stop the macOS app (if it supervises the Gateway) or terminate your openclaw gateway process.
2. Close exposure: set gateway.bind: "loopback" (or disable Tailscale Funnel/Serve) until you understand what happened.
3. Freeze access: switch risky DMs/groups to dmPolicy: "disabled" / require mentions, and remove any "*" allow-all entries.

Rotate (assume compromise if secrets leaked)

1. Rotate Gateway auth (gateway.auth.token / gateway.auth.password). Rotation hot-applies only when the effective auth mode stays the same; set gateway.auth.mode explicitly for SecretRefs. Restart for an auth-mode change or updated process environment credentials such as OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_PASSWORD.
2. Rotate remote client secrets (gateway.remote.token / .password) on any machine that can call the Gateway.
3. Rotate provider/API credentials (WhatsApp creds, Slack/Discord tokens, model/API keys in SQLite auth stores, and encrypted secrets payload values when used).

Audit

1. Check Gateway logs with openclaw logs (or openclaw --profile <profile> logs for a named profile). The default path is /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-YYYY-MM-DD.log; named profiles use /tmp/openclaw/openclaw-<profile>-YYYY-MM-DD.log, unless logging.file overrides it.
2. Review the relevant transcript(s): ~/.openclaw/agents/<agentId>/sessions/*.jsonl.
3. Review recent config changes that could have widened access: gateway.bind, gateway.auth, DM/group policies, tools.elevated, plugin changes.
4. Re-run openclaw security audit --deep and confirm critical findings are resolved.

Collect for a report

• Timestamp, gateway host OS + OpenClaw version.
• The session transcript(s) + a short log tail (after redacting).
• What the attacker sent and what the agent did.
• Whether the Gateway was exposed beyond loopback (LAN/Tailscale Funnel/Serve).