Security
Initial access (AML.TA0004)
Threats in the initial access tactic (AML.TA0004) of the MITRE ATLAS framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations.
The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the threat model index, which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping.
T-ACCESS-001: Pairing code interception
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| ATLAS ID | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| Description | Attacker intercepts a pairing code during the pairing window (1h DM/generic pairing, 5m node pairing) |
| Attack vector | Shoulder surfing, network sniffing, social engineering |
| Affected components | Device pairing system |
| Current mitigations | 1h TTL (DM/generic pairing), 5m TTL (node pairing); codes sent via the existing channel |
| Residual risk | Medium - pairing window exploitable |
| Recommendations | Reduce pairing window, add a confirmation step |
T-ACCESS-002: AllowFrom spoofing
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| ATLAS ID | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| Description | Attacker spoofs an allowed sender identity on a channel |
| Attack vector | Channel-dependent - phone number spoofing, username impersonation |
| Affected components | Per-channel AllowFrom validation |
| Current mitigations | Channel-specific identity verification; graded identifier-authentication gate uses min(entry, subject) over verified > asserted > unverified > mutable with exact match provenance and default minimum asserted (#123782/#123793). Channels declare per-identifier strength; security audit warns on inert mutable entries (#131129). |
| Residual risk | Medium - some channels remain vulnerable to spoofing |
| Recommendations | Continue per-channel verified adoption and downstream strength mappers; document channel-specific risks |
T-ACCESS-003: Token theft
| Attribute | Value |
|---|---|
| ATLAS ID | AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access |
| Description | Attacker steals authentication tokens from config/credential files |
| Attack vector | Malware, unauthorized device access, config backup exposure |
| Affected components | Channel/provider credential storage, config storage |
| Current mitigations | File permissions |
| Residual risk | High - tokens stored in plaintext on disk |
| Recommendations | Implement token encryption at rest, add token rotation |
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