Security

Collection and exfiltration (AML.TA0009, AML.TA0010)

Threats in the collection and exfiltration tactic (AML.TA0009, AML.TA0010) of the MITRE ATLAS framework. Each entry lists the ATLAS technique, attack vector, affected components, current mitigations, residual risk, and recommendations.

The trust boundaries and data flows these threats cross are defined in the threat model index, which also holds the risk matrix, the recommendations summary, and the ATLAS technique mapping.

T-EXFIL-001: Data theft via web_fetch

Attribute Value
ATLAS ID AML.T0009 - Collection
Description Attacker exfiltrates data by instructing the agent to send it to an external URL
Attack vector Prompt injection causing the agent to POST data to an attacker server
Affected components web_fetch tool
Current mitigations SSRF blocking for internal/private networks (DNS pinning + IP blocking)
Residual risk High - arbitrary external URLs remain permitted
Recommendations URL allowlisting, data-classification awareness

T-EXFIL-002: Unauthorized message sending

Attribute Value
ATLAS ID AML.T0009 - Collection
Description Attacker causes the agent to send messages containing sensitive data
Attack vector Prompt injection causing the agent to message the attacker
Affected components Message tool, channel integrations
Current mitigations Outbound messaging gating
Residual risk Medium - gating may be bypassed
Recommendations Explicit confirmation for new recipients

T-EXFIL-003: Credential harvesting

Attribute Value
ATLAS ID AML.T0009 - Collection
Description Malicious skill harvests credentials from the agent context
Attack vector Skill code reads environment variables, config files
Affected components Skill execution environment
Current mitigations ClawHub credential-pattern scanning (hardcoded secrets, credential env access paired with network sends); no execution sandboxing for skills at runtime
Residual risk Critical - skills run with agent privileges
Recommendations Skill execution sandboxing, credential isolation
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