OpenClawDocs
View as MarkdownView this page as plain textOpen in ChatGPTAsk questions about this pageOpen in ClaudeAsk questions about this page

CLI commands

Author a policy file

Enabling the plugin and writing the policy artifact. Part of the openclaw policy reference.

Quick start

bash
openclaw plugins enable policy

The plugin stays enabled even when policy.jsonc is missing, so doctor can report the missing artifact instead of silently skipping checks.

Author policy.jsonc by hand; it is not generated from current settings. Each top-level section is a rule namespace: a check only runs when a concrete rule is present under it (unsupported sections or keys fail as policy/policy-jsonc-invalid instead of being silently ignored). Minimal example covering every supported section:

validate=false
{  "channels": {    "denyRules": [      {        "id": "no-telegram",        "when": { "provider": "telegram" },        "reason": "Telegram is not approved for this workspace.",      },    ],  },  "mcp": {    "servers": {      "allow": ["docs"],      "deny": ["untrusted"],    },  },  "models": {    "providers": {      "allow": ["openai", "anthropic"],      "deny": ["openrouter"],    },  },  "network": {    "privateNetwork": {      "allow": false,    },  },  "routing": {    "requireBindings": true,    "requireConfiguredChannels": true,    "probes": [      {        "id": "family-dm",        "route": {          "channel": "imessage",          "peer": { "kind": "direct", "id": "+15555550123" },        },        "expect": {          "agentId": "family",          "matchedBy": ["binding.peer"],        },      },    ],  },  "ingress": {    "session": {      "requireDmScope": "per-channel-peer",    },    "channels": {      "allowDmPolicies": ["pairing", "allowlist", "disabled"],      "denyOpenGroups": true,      "requireMentionInGroups": true,    },  },  "gateway": {    "exposure": {      "allowNonLoopbackBind": false,      "allowTailscaleFunnel": false,    },    "auth": {      "requireAuth": true,      "requireExplicitRateLimit": true,    },    "controlUi": {      "allowInsecure": false,    },    "remote": {      "allow": false,    },    "http": {      "denyEndpoints": ["chatCompletions", "responses"],      "requireUrlAllowlists": true,    },    "nodes": {      "denyCommands": ["system.run"],    },  },  "agents": {    "workspace": {      "allowedAccess": ["none", "ro"],      "denyTools": ["exec", "process", "write", "edit", "apply_patch"],    },  },  "dataHandling": {    "sensitiveLogging": {      "requireRedaction": true,    },    "telemetry": {      "denyContentCapture": true,    },    "retention": {      "requireSessionMaintenance": true,    },    "memory": {      "denySessionTranscriptIndexing": true,    },  },  "secrets": {    "requireManagedProviders": true,    "denySources": ["exec"],    "allowInsecureProviders": false,  },  "auth": {    "profiles": {      "requireMetadata": ["provider", "mode"],      "allowModes": ["api_key", "token"],    },  },  "execApprovals": {    "requireFile": true,    "defaults": { "allowSecurity": ["deny"] },    "agents": {      "allowSecurity": ["deny", "allowlist"],      "allowAutoAllowSkills": false,      "allowlist": { "expected": ["deploy", "status"] },    },  },  "tools": {    "requireMetadata": ["risk", "sensitivity", "owner"],    "profiles": {      "allow": ["messaging", "minimal"],    },    "fs": {      "requireWorkspaceOnly": true,    },    "exec": {      "allowSecurity": ["deny", "allowlist"],      "requireAsk": ["always"],      "allowHosts": ["sandbox"],    },    "elevated": {      "allow": false,    },    "denyTools": ["group:runtime", "group:fs"],  },}

Cross-cutting notes not obvious from the rule tables:

  • Omitting gateway.bind while denying non-loopback binds means you accept the runtime default; set gateway.bind: "loopback" for strict conformance.
  • For a read-only agent, set sandbox mode to all or non-main on the applicable defaults/agent and workspaceAccess to none or ro. Missing or off sandbox mode does not satisfy a read-only policy.
  • agents.workspace.denyTools accepts exec, process, write, edit, apply_patch. The config tool-deny groups group:fs (file mutation) and group:runtime (shell/process) satisfy the equivalent posture.
  • Exec-approvals checks read the live SQLite approvals document only when an execApprovals rule is present; a missing or invalid artifact is unobservable evidence, not a synthetic pass.
  • Secret and auth-profile evidence records provider/source posture and SecretRef metadata only, never raw values. Policy does not read or attest per-agent credential stores such as openclaw-agent.sqlite.
  • Data-handling evidence is config-level posture (telemetry capture toggle, session maintenance mode, transcript-indexing setting) plus the always-on log redaction invariant. It does not inspect logs, telemetry exports, transcripts, or memory files, and a clean result does not prove that no personal data or secrets exist in them.
  • Routing probes reuse OpenClaw's runtime binding resolver. Routing evidence records only the probe id, resolved agent, match kind, and redacted binding metadata. It never records peer, account, guild, team, or role identifiers. Adding a routing section intentionally changes the policy and attestation hashes; policies without routing keep their existing evidence shape.
Was this useful?
On this page

On this page