Plugin SDK infrastructure registration

Registrars for hooks, Gateway HTTP routes and RPC methods, CLI entries, and background services, plus the SDK helpers those surfaces depend on. Part of the Plugin SDK overview.

Infrastructure

Gateway methods default to profileAccess: "required", so authenticated-profile verification fails closed before plugin dispatch. Set profileAccess: "independent" only for an audited method that neither reads nor mutates durable user or session state. Operator scope remains a separate authorization requirement.

File-watch capacity errors

getFileWatchCapacityCode(error) from openclaw/plugin-sdk/file-access-runtime returns EMFILE, ENFILE, or ENOSPC for a native watch failure, or undefined for other errors. It requires syscall: "watch" because watcher libraries can forward directory-scan errors through the same error event. Use the result in the watcher lifecycle owner to stop native retries and select an existing refresh path.

SQLite write admission

runSqliteImmediateTransaction(db, prepare, options?) from openclaw/plugin-sdk/sqlite-runtime waits for write admission without blocking the event loop. Its asynchronous prepare function may run more than once when another writer holds the database. Keep preparation repeatable: read and plan there, then return a synchronous transaction callback. Revalidate current owner and row predicates inside that callback before writing.

Returning undefined from preparation skips the write and resolves the helper to undefined, even while another writer remains active. Otherwise, the helper resolves to the transaction callback's result. It rejects an already active transaction or preparation that leaves a transaction open. Once admitted, the callback runs once; callback and commit failures are never replayed.

Admission retries use the connection's existing busy_timeout; this is not a total deadline for preparation or transaction execution. options supplies the same transaction diagnostics as runSqliteImmediateTransactionSync. Keep the database handle and its owning operation alive until the returned promise settles.

Webhook body rejection

Use readWebhookBodyOrReject or readJsonWebhookBodyOrReject from openclaw/plugin-sdk/webhook-request-guards for bounded body reads. Return when the result is { ok: false }; the helper owns the error response and connection cleanup. Body byte limits and read timeouts remain separate from transport cleanup.

For a custom error representation after a response-first body read, await sendHttpRequestRejection(req, res, statusCode, body, contentType?) instead of calling res.end() and destroying the request. It preserves security headers, frames the complete error, then on Node closes the write side while keeping application body readers paused. Node's request backpressure bounds residual input buffering; cleanup allows at most one second, not another body-read timeout. A disconnected peer, malformed HTTP, or an exhausted cleanup budget can prevent delivery. Committed responses are closed without appending a replacement error or completing a partial successful body.

On Node, transport-owned rejections emit response close without finish. Use close for terminal cleanup or selected-error diagnostics; it does not prove delivery. Keep successful-response activity on finish, with the caller's success-status check, so an aborted request cannot report healthy activity.

Bun uses its native HTTP response completion because its raw socket operations do not flush the HTTP response. Bun can still report client connection resets during large outstanding uploads, even after delivering the complete error.

Gateway HTTP requests run in order on each connection, including their response lifetimes. A closing connection cannot admit later requests or upgrades. Queued requests apply input backpressure until earlier responses finish; finite pipelines drain in order. Use separate connections for concurrent requests. Keep the release hook returned by beginWebhookRequestPipelineOrReject in finally; it retains any selected rejection cleanup before releasing the in-flight slot.

Post-ack webhook work

Webhook routes that acknowledge a request before processing finishes must move that detached work onto its own tracked admission root:

import { runDetachedWebhookWork } from "openclaw/plugin-sdk/webhook-request-guards"; void runDetachedWebhookWork(() => processWebhookEvent(event)).catch((error) => {  runtime.error?.(`webhook dispatch failed: ${String(error)}`);});

Call runDetachedWebhookWork(...) synchronously while the HTTP request is still admitted. The helper reserves an independent root immediately, then starts the callback in the next microtask so the request handler can write its acknowledgement first. The returned promise adopts the callback result; callers still own rejection handling. This keeps post-ack queue work accepted and makes restart or suspension drains wait for it. Handlers that await all processing before returning do not need this helper.

Requester-scoped MCP connections

Keep the MCP server identity static (name, tool filter) in mcp.servers, a native plugin's mcpServers manifest field, or a bundle manifest. Optionally register a connection resolver so each trusted message requester gets their own transport:

api.registerMcpServerConnectionResolver({  serverName: "user-email",  resolve: async (ctx) => {    // ctx.requesterSenderId is host-trusted; never invent sender identity here.    const token = await lookupUserToken(ctx.requesterSenderId);    if (!token) {      return null; // omit this server for the current run    }    return {      url: "https://mcp.example.com/email",      headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },    };  },});

Contract notes:

• Resolver context carries trusted host identity only (requesterSenderId, optional agentAccountId / messageChannel). Future trusted fields (for example cron/subagent user context) can be added additively.
• One plugin owns one server name: a duplicate registerMcpServerConnectionResolver for the same serverName from another plugin is rejected with an error diagnostic (first registration wins), so connection ownership never depends on plugin load order.
• Tool names are derived from the full declared server set so partial resolution never changes safe server names between requesters or turns. Core does not verify that different requester endpoints serve identical tool schemas; a resolver must point every requester at the same logical service, or tool schemas (and prompt-cache stability) diverge per requester.
• Runs without a trusted requesterSenderId (cron, subagent, heartbeat, public gateway) never materialize requester-scoped servers. There is no shared fallback connection.
• resolve is bounded at 10 seconds per server; a timeout or throw omits that server for the run without failing static MCP.
• Resolved connections are revalidated at most every 5 minutes per requester: rotation rebuilds the transport with fresh credentials, and a null result revokes it (the cached runtime is disposed even mid-session). A revoked or rotated credential can therefore stay in use for up to 5 minutes.
• Resolved headers are never logged or persisted; core keeps only an ephemeral in-memory keyed digest (process-local HMAC) to detect credential rotation, and registers resolved header/URL credential values with the log/debug-capture redaction registry.
• Requester-scoped servers do not mint MCP App views: a view outlives the requester-authenticated run and the gateway view boundary has no requester identity, so app previews stay fail-closed for these servers. Tool results are unaffected.
• Static servers without a resolver keep the existing session-scoped lifecycle.
• Harness delivery rule: requester-scoped servers never enter harness-native MCP client config (Codex thread mcp_servers, CLI -c mcp_servers=…, or any other session-shared MCP projection). Harnesses deliver them as run-scoped tools instead:
  • Embedded runner: session MCP runtime + bundle tools (static + scoped).
  • Codex app-server: dynamic tools via materializeRequesterScopedMcpToolsForHarnessRun (scoped-only; static servers stay on Codex's native MCP client).
• Scoped tool specs are session-stable after the first successful resolve in that session, so shared-thread harnesses (Codex) do not rotate threads when senders change. Before any requester resolves, no scoped specs are advertised.
• Unauthenticated requesters on a shared-thread harness still see the advertised scoped tools; calling one returns a clean not-connected tool error for that requester. OpenClaw never falls back to another requester's credentials.

Memory prompt supplement builders receive optional agentId, agentSessionKey, and sandboxed context. Memory corpus supplement search and get calls receive optional agentId and sandboxed context. Plugins with agent-owned storage should resolve that storage for each call instead of capturing one global path during registration. If an agent id is required but missing in a multi-agent operation, fail closed rather than choosing an arbitrary agent.

Use registerMemoryPromptPreparation(...) when prompt text depends on async plugin state. The callback runs once before each full agent prompt and receives the same tool, agent, session, and sandbox context as synchronous memory prompt builders. Validate the current storage-owner instance before loading persisted state, then return only lines for that run. OpenClaw freezes those lines and hands the immutable result to synchronous prompt assembly. Keep persistence, atomic replacement, and owner-removal deletion inside the owning plugin; do not poll or read files from a prompt builder.

Telegram interactive handlers can return { submitText } to route text through Telegram's normal inbound agent path after the handler succeeds. OpenClaw keeps the callback button when inbound policy skips the text or processing fails, so the user can retry after the blocking condition changes. This result field is Telegram-specific; other channels keep their own interactive result contracts.